Rupture, Reform and Reimagining Democracy

By BRAC Institute of Governance and Development
From Rupture to Renewal: What BIGD’s Democracy Report Tells Us About Bangladesh’s Political Future…

The BRAC Institute of Governance and Development’s (BIGD) latest State of Governance report, Rupture, Reform and Reimagining Democracy, is far more than just an annual assessment of governance in Bangladesh, rather It is an attempt to make sense of a country emerging from one of the most turbulent political episodes in its history.

The State of Governance has been a signature BIGD publication for nearly two decades. Yet the 2024�"25 edition is markedly different. It has emerged from an unprecedented political rupture following the collapse of the Sheikh Hasina regime on 5 August 2024 and the student- and citizen-led uprising that preceded it. 

Reviewed by Shahriar Feroze 

The report’s seven chapters including graphics contain a preface and executive summary. It comprehensively examines the political transition, institutional reform and changing public expectations with a combination of empirical research and critical observation.

For us, however, the report’s most important message is that removal of authoritarian political elite does not automatically produce democratic transformation.

This insight is particularly prominent in Chapter 3, titled “Post-Uprising Politics”. BIGD observes that although many political elites were removed, yet there remained a strong continuity among bureaucratic, business and other established elites. The uncomfortable question that follows is whether Bangladesh has genuinely transformed its political system or merely experienced another circulation of dynastic politics. And that is a question worth taking seriously. 

Political transformation cannot be measured simply by who occupies ministerial offices or controls the state apparatus. It must ultimately be judged by whether institutions become more accountable, citizens acquire greater political agency and power becomes subject to meaningful checks and balances.

The report is equally revealing about the reform process itself. While consultations initially generated wider public engagement, but citizen participation appears to have diminished as reform discussions became increasingly technical and confined to policy-making circles. Women, religious minorities and ethnic communities were particularly under-represented. Reform undertaken in the name of the people, ultimately became scarcely owned by the people.

This concern is further buttressed by the report’s findings on public optimism. Following the uprising, 71 percent of citizens believed that Bangladesh was moving in the right political direction, compared to 41 percent earlier in 2024. More than 80 percent supported the continuation of the Interim Government for a period they considered necessary to ensure credible elections and implement essential reforms.

Yet by July 2025, optimism had fallen sharply to 42 percent, while the absence of an elected government had become one of the public’s major concerns. This decline is perhaps one of the report’s most important warnings. Revolutions and uprisings generate extraordinary expectations, but expectations cannot remain suspended indefinitely. 

When political promises are not translated into visible improvements in state-run institutions and everyday life, public enthusiasm inevitably gives way to impatience, frustration and cynicism.

Chapter 6, titled “Visibility without Power”, is also revealing in this respect. Its focus on groups whose presence may have become more visible without a corresponding increase in substantive political power underscores an important dimension of post-uprising politics. Representation cannot simply mean appearing at the table - it also means possessing a meaningful voice in decisions.

The report’s discussion on ‘free riders’ is similarly thought provoking. Groups seeking to appropriate the political space created by the uprising, including violent or extremist actors had also complicated the democratic transition, weakened public confidence while created opportunities for entrenched interests to resist genuine reform.

Yet BIGD report does not end in despair, its position on constitutional reform, police reform, primary-school governance, inclusive local government, and transparency in local-government service delivery demonstrated that institutional renewal remains very much possible.

Ultimately, Rupture, Reform and Reimagining Democracy leaves us with a constructive message. Bangladesh’s key challenge is no longer merely changing governments, but it is changing the relationship between citizens, institutions and political power.

The way forward is therefore neither to romanticise the uprising nor to dismiss its achievements. We need credible elections, independent and accountable institutions, genuine citizen participation and reforms that survive changes of government. Most importantly, political parties and state institutions must also recognise that the people who created the rupture cannot be reduced to spectators of the reform process.

The report’s optimism is consequently not a prediction that democracy will automatically succeed. It is more of an open invitation to make it succeed. The rupture has already happened. Whether it becomes the beginning of democratic renewal or merely another chapter in Bangladesh’s cycle of political exclusion will depend on what we do with the opportunity it created.