For thousands of residents in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), daily life is a calculation of survival. They are trapped in a violent ecosystem of armed factions- chiefly the United People's Democratic Front (UPDF), the Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF), the Jana Sanghati Samiti (JSS) some other armed groups- who have turned the region into a conflict zone
This is not just a political conflict; it is a "Terror Economy," funded by systematic extortion, fueled by cross-border arms smuggling, and enforced by targeted killings.
An investigative media analysis estimates the annual extortion revenue from the CHT is staggering, likely exceeding BDT 400-500 crore (approx. $34-$42 Million USD). This money is not just funding a political movement; it is funding a regional arms race and a brutal internecine war for control.
The real image of fear in the CHT is not always the sound of gunfire, but the silent, systematic paralysis of extortion. "We are living under terrorism. It is not a war; it is a protection racket," said a small-business owner in Rangamati, who would only speak on the condition of absolute anonymity. "I pay 'tolls' to the JSS to keep my shop open, and my drivers pay the UPDF to pass their checkpoints. If a new road is built, it's just a new 'toll' point. We are their bank account."
This tax is levied on everyone- from salaried government employees to non-government employees, who must forfeit a portion of their pay, to impoverished farmers charged for selling their own produce. The choice for residents is stark- pay or flee. "We left our village after repeated demands for money by armed men," an elder from a displaced family said. "We couldn't farm. Our children go hungry. They have guns, we have nothing. What choice do we have?"
This fear has emptied entire hamlets. Following ethnic violence in September 2024 that killed four and saw dozens of homes torched, Reuters reported mass displacement. These regional armed organizations are behind this violence. This is the recurring pattern: violence flares, and civilians are forced to abandon their ancestral lands.
Similarly, in late September, three people died in protests and violence over the false accusation of rape of a Marma teenager. The UPDF was directly involved in this incident. The medical board found no signs of rape and the three deceased were not killed by law enforcement. It has been learned from talking to some local journalists that the UPDF may have carried out this massacre to strengthen the movement.
The extortion money is funneled directly into securing more power, territory, and weapons. This has created a bloody turf war, where the primary victims are not security forces, but other locals and rival faction members.
While exact figures are obscured by the remote terrain, local human rights monitors and news tallies paint a grim picture. It is estimated that in the last five years alone, over 400 people have been murdered in the CHT, the vast majority of them civilians or political activists killed in "internecine" clashes- factional assassinations for control of territory.
April 16, 2025: Five university students returning from a festival were abducted near Khagrachhari, an act the student body blamed on the UPDF (Prasit Khisa group). April 3, 2025: In a clear sign of the turf war, the UPDF publicly accused the Santu Larma-led JSS of abducting Uttam Kumar Chakma, the brother of a UPDF leader, from a public market in broad daylight.
The political leaders of the hills- Santu Larma, Prasit Khisa, Michael Chakma, and the KNF's Nathan Bawm-are not just politicians. They are power brokers in this parallel economy, where political patronage and criminal enterprise are indistinguishable. Michael Chakma, for instance, has previously been convicted in extortion cases, blurring the line between activist and criminal.
The terror economy is self-sustaining. Extortion funds the purchase of sophisticated weapons, which in turn enforces the extortion. The porous border with Myanmar and India is the pipeline.
The emergence of the KNF has added a new, volatile element. In April 2024, KNF militants staged a series of brazen, military-style raids on banks in Ruma and Thanchi, looting cash, stealing 14 police weapons, and kidnapping a bank manager- a shocking escalation from clandestine extortion to open warfare.
The 1997 Peace Accord was designed to bring lasting stability to the region. In line with its provisions, the withdrawal of military camps began gradually, and security sources indicate that more than 250 camps have been removed to date. However, this drawdown has created a security vacuum in many of the areas where troops were withdrawn, allowing armed groups to re-establish influence and expand their activities. Despite their limited manpower, law-enforcement units are attempting to respond, but the expanding footprint of armed groups has outpaced their capacity, leaving several areas vulnerable. Law enforcement forces is seizing weapons, making arrests, and attempting to resettle families- but they are treating the symptoms, not the disease.
As one district official warned, "We can resettle families temporarily, but unless these extortion networks are dismantled, civilians remain at risk."
The Chittagong Hill Tracts is caught in a destructive, self-perpetuating cycle. Political grievances are repeatedly weaponized as a shield for entrenched criminal networks. These groups levy extortion under the guise of political dues, funneling the money into arms purchases. The guns, in turn, enforce fear, sustain the extortion economy, and fuel brutal turf wars between rival factions. Trapped in the middle are ordinary residents- forced to pay for their own oppression, watching neighbors disappear or die, and living under a system where survival is taxed and dissent can be fatal.
The writer is a security analyst
