
The image of India's External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar greeting Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in New Delhi conveys more than a routine diplomatic exchange. It symbolises a decisive transformation in the political and strategic order of South Asia. Only a few years ago, India had shut its embassy in Kabul after the Taliban's takeover in 2021. Today, the same two governments are engaging directly, indicating a major policy reversal grounded in calculated realism.
Muttaqi's six-day visit to India, the first by a Taliban leader since the group's return to power, together with New Delhi's decision to upgrade its Kabul technical mission to a full embassy, marks the consolidation of this new approach. The shift reflects broader regional change: Pakistan's waning influence, evolving great-power rivalries, and the emergence of new partnerships that are reshaping South Asia's geopolitical map.
India's relationship with Afghanistan has followed a pattern shaped by regional circumstances. During the Taliban's first rule between 1996 and 2001, India opposed the regime, closing its embassy and supporting the Northern Alliance, which resisted what New Delhi viewed as a Pakistan-backed government. After the Taliban's fall in 2001, India became one of Afghanistan's most important development partners, contributing more than three billion dollars to infrastructure, education, and health projects. These initiatives earned India considerable goodwill among the Afghan people and strengthened its regional presence.
When the Taliban returned to power in 2021, India was forced to evacuate its embassy and suspend visa services, resulting in a complete diplomatic withdrawal. Yet within a year, New Delhi began to cautiously rebuild contact by reopening a small technical mission in June 2022 to coordinate humanitarian assistance. This gradual process expanded through discreet diplomacy, including the issue of visas to Taliban representatives, the handover of Afghan consulates in Mumbai and Hyderabad, and quiet meetings in third countries such as Dubai. Muttaqi's recent visit represents the culmination of this deliberate, step-by-step engagement.
India's approach has been primarily driven by security concerns. The Taliban's explicit assurance that Afghan territory would not be used against India addresses one of New Delhi's central anxieties over cross-border terrorism. The group's condemnation of the April 2025 Pahalgam attack in Jammu and Kashmir further indicated a possible shift away from Pakistan's long-standing strategy of supporting militancy for political gain. The growing hostility between Islamabad and Kabul, marked by border clashes and hostile rhetoric, has created new diplomatic space for India to safeguard its interests and ensure Afghanistan does not once again become a base for anti-India activities.
Economic considerations are equally important. Afghanistan's mineral resources, valued at around one trillion dollars, present major opportunities for Indian investment. During his visit, Muttaqi invited Indian firms to take part in Afghanistan's mining sector, opening a potential area of cooperation that could offset Chinese and Pakistani influence. India has also prioritised trade routes that bypass Pakistan, such as the India-Afghanistan Air Freight Corridor and Iran's Chabahar Port. These routes improve India's access to Central Asia while reducing Afghanistan's dependence on Pakistani transit.
On the diplomatic front, India has pursued a policy of cautious engagement without formal recognition. Upgrading its Kabul mission to embassy level and hosting Muttaqi at the ministerial level demonstrates growing interaction, yet New Delhi has avoided extending official recognition to the Taliban government. This restrained approach mirrors that of China and Iran while differing from Russia's decision to recognise the Taliban formally. It allows India to retain flexibility and influence while maintaining leverage on issues such as governance, women's rights, and inclusivity.
Pakistan's declining influence over the Taliban represents a major strategic setback for Islamabad. Relations between the two have worsened sharply, with both sides trading accusations and engaging in sporadic armed clashes. The Taliban's outreach to India marks a deliberate effort to reduce dependence on Pakistan and establish a more autonomous foreign policy. This shift aligns closely with India's objective of ensuring Afghanistan does not serve as Pakistan's strategic extension.
This realignment takes place against the backdrop of intensified global competition. China maintains an active diplomatic and economic presence in Kabul and has encouraged Afghanistan to join the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Russia, which has recognised the Taliban government, has assumed a central role in regional diplomacy through mechanisms such as the Moscow Format consultations. The United States, in contrast, has kept its distance from the Taliban, creating opportunities for regional actors such as India to shape outcomes independently. India's willingness to engage despite Western reservations reflects its growing foreign policy confidence and pursuit of strategic autonomy.
Nonetheless, India's engagement brings political and ethical challenges. The Taliban's record on women's rights, including restrictions on education, employment, and public participation, conflicts directly with India's democratic principles. Controversy arose during Muttaqi's visit when women journalists were initially excluded from his press conference, drawing sharp criticism at home. Public figures such as Javed Akhtar expressed disappointment, questioning whether India's strategic interests justify hosting representatives of an openly repressive regime. The government must therefore navigate the delicate balance between national interests and moral responsibility.
India's approach to Taliban-led Afghanistan reflects a more mature and realistic foreign policy. It recognises that isolation achieves little and that engagement offers a path to influence and stability. By maintaining direct communication, India seeks to safeguard its security, expand economic opportunities, and prevent Afghanistan from falling exclusively under the sway of rivals such as Pakistan or China.
The emerging regional consensus, evident in forums like the Moscow Format, suggests that Afghanistan's neighbours are increasingly committed to practical cooperation rather than ideological confrontation. This collective pragmatism allows regional powers to engage the Taliban without extending full legitimacy while focusing on shared priorities such as counterterrorism, trade, and humanitarian relief.
For India, the ultimate test lies in balancing strategic engagement with adherence to values. Success will depend on New Delhi's ability to protect its interests, promote stability, and advocate for inclusivity within Afghanistan. The handshake between Jaishankar and Muttaqi in New Delhi may have closed one chapter of estrangement, but it has opened another, one that will shape the future of South Asia's regional order for years to come.
The writer is Editor of Geopolits.com