The Bhusanchhara massacre of May 31, 1984, remains one of the darkest and most brutal episodes in the history of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. In the wee hours, just after Sehri during Ramadan, the armed terrorists of the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti, known as the Shanti Bahini, stormed the remote Bengali Muslim settlement of Bhusanchhara in Rangamati.
An estimated 125 to 150 armed terrorists attacked around 4 a.m. with rifles, bayonets and homemade sharp weapons. Within four hours, more than 400 people were killed. Women, children and the elderly were among the dead. Survivors recount unspeakable horrors, pregnant women mutilated, infants killed, women were gang raped, homes set ablaze. Over 300 houses were destroyed and more than a thousand people were left wounded. The assault came in two waves, first at dawn and then again later in the morning when survivors returned to search for loved ones.
The insurgent group, Shanti Bahini, was formed in 1972, posed a direct threat to Bangladesh's sovereignty. Their goal was either to merge the CHT with India or to carve out a separate state, which challenged the country's integrity. Trained and armed from camps in India's Tripura, they waged a guerrilla war that left an estimated 25,000 people dead and forced 600,000 to flee from the vicinity.
The root of the violence lay in government resettlement programs of the late 1970s. Poor Bengali families were relocated to khas land in the hill districts, sparking resistance from the terrorist group Shanti Bahini. Bhusanchhara became a turning point, igniting decades of mistrust and bloodshed between Bengalis and tribal communities.
By portraying the government's resettlement program as "land grabbing," they fueled ethnic hatred. Even after the 1997 Peace Accord, splinter groups like the UPDF carried on with violence. Recent protests in Khagrachhari, marked by a rape incident and clashes, echo this bloody legacy. Army commander Hasan Mahmud warned, "This is part of a bigger plan."
Yet, instead of justice, there was silence. The then government downplayed the massacre for political reasons. No murder case was lodged. Only a general diary entry at the local police station was filed. Promises of compensation, two acres of land and cash for each family, were never kept. Survivors received little more than 5,000 taka each and a sack of rice. Out of 1,600 families, more than a hundred were wiped out entirely.
Four decades later, justice has yet to come. Victims' families continue to demand that terrorist group Shanti Bahini leaders be tried as war criminals. The massacre stands as a grim reminder of how impunity breeds unrest. Recent violence in Khagrachhari echoes that unresolved history, showing that even after the Peace Accord, the hills remain fragile and unsettled.
To make the hilly districts liveable for hill dwellers and plain residents alike, a reasonable number of landless Bengalis must be promptly resettled on the khas land there, coupled with viable employment opportunities. This will create a tapestry of shared prosperity in the hilly areas.
Reinstating the withdrawn army camps in the CHT is an urgent imperative of at the present time, alongside establishing two or more cantonments in sensitive and strategic zones, to fortify national integrity and nurture enduring tranquility.
For permanent peace, the government should roll out a robust system that bridges crevasse among people and rigorously limit and monitor foreign NGOs' operations to curb external influences. Tribal communities should be actively involved in cultural, educational and social initiatives with mainstream Bangladeshis, fostering bonds that turn potential rifts into harmonious alliances.
The perpetrators may be linked to the armed Shanti Bahini terrorists. But behind them were political leaders of the PCJSS, who openly opposed Bengali resettlement. Some accounts suggest that external groups, including sympathizers in India, provided them with training, arms and sanctuary. The massacre was not just a spontaneous outburst. It was a calculated move to instill fear and drive settlers out.
During the 1980s and 1990s, many local and international NGOs took up the cause of "tribal sovereignty" in the CHT. While some genuinely worked for development, others indirectly legitimized militancy by portraying the terrorist Shanti Bahini as freedom fighters resisting "Bengali colonialism." Funds and platforms meant for human rights advocacy often blurred the line between protecting tribal rights and justifying violence. This narrative helped the perpetrators escape global condemnation, while the massacre victims remained voiceless.
The writer is Head of photography of The Daily Observer
