Diplomacy, like chess, thrives on anticipation, positioning, and the strategic deployment of influence. As Bangladesh's Chief Adviser, Professor Dr. Muhammad Yunus, embarks on a highly anticipated visit to China, the question lingering in policy circles is: What does this visit signify beyond the ceremonial niceties of statecraft?
The Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh, Yao Wen, has added an element of intrigue, stating that an "important declaration" could emerge. When pressed for details, his response was deliberately cryptic: "Wait and see. We are still working on the matter." Such ambiguity, typical of Chinese diplomacy, raises more questions than it answers. What exactly is on the table?
Foreign Affairs Adviser Touhid Hossain has attempted to downplay expectations, insisting that there will be no formal agreements, only a series of Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs). But in the realm of geopolitics, MoUs are often the first step toward deeper strategic engagements. Given that Dr. Yunus's visit will be followed just a week later by a crucial meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, it is evident that Bangladesh is navigating a delicate balance between two regional powerhouses.
Dr. Yunus's trip to China is not merely another high-level diplomatic exchange. It comes at a time when Beijing's strategic ambitions in South Asia are intensifying, and Bangladesh finds itself increasingly central to this evolving dynamic. The visit coincides with the Boao Forum for Asia, an annual event often dubbed the "Asian Davos," where global corporate and political leaders converge. That Dr. Yunus is attending the personal invitation of Chinese President Xi Jinping speaks volumes about Beijing's interest in Bangladesh. But beyond the speeches and networking, the visit carries deeper implications.
Beijing's economic and geopolitical engagement with Bangladesh has grown significantly in recent years. China is already the largest supplier of military hardware to Bangladesh and its biggest trading partner. It has also been a crucial infrastructure partner, with major investments in energy, transport, and connectivity projects under its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, China's aspirations go beyond economic ties. It sees Bangladesh as a pivotal player in the Indian Ocean region-a strategic corridor in Beijing's grand plan to counterbalance India's influence in South Asia. With India and the United States intensifying their Indo-Pacific strategy to contain China, Beijing's outreach to Dhaka is as much about securing an economic foothold as it is about shaping the regional security architecture.
One issue that will undoubtedly come up in discussions is the Teesta River project, where China has proposed financing major infrastructure developments. The project is crucial for Bangladesh's water security, but it has raised concerns in India, which has long viewed Chinese-funded initiatives in its neighborhood with suspicion. India's strategic community will be watching closely to see whether Dhaka moves ahead with Chinese involvement in the Teesta project, as it could have significant implications for regional water politics.
Beyond infrastructure and trade, one area where Bangladesh seeks tangible Chinese support is the Rohingya refugee crisis. Over a million Rohingya refugees have been languishing in Bangladesh since 2017, with no concrete resolution in sight. Dhaka has repeatedly sought international pressure on Myanmar to facilitate repatriation, but progress has been minimal.
China, as Myanmar's most influential ally, holds significant leverage over the junta in Naypyidaw. Previous Chinese-led mediation efforts between Bangladesh and Myanmar have been largely performative, yielding little substantive change. However, given Bangladesh's upcoming international conference on the Rohingya crisis in September, Dhaka may push Beijing to take a more "constructive and result-oriented role" in resolving the issue.
“Professor Yunus's visit to China is far more than a diplomatic
formality. It is a crucial moment in Bangladesh's strategic
evolution-one that will shape its geopolitical and economic trajectory
in the coming years. At stake is how Bangladesh positions itself in an
increasingly polarized global order, where China, India, and the United
States are all competing for influence”
China's position on this matter remains complex. While it has occasionally expressed support for repatriation, Beijing's overriding interest is in maintaining stability in Myanmar, where it has extensive investments in energy and infrastructure. It is unlikely to pressure Myanmar beyond a symbolic level, but Bangladesh will nonetheless make its case for stronger Chinese engagement.
Another key area of discussion will be deepening economic cooperation. While China has granted Bangladesh duty-free access to 97% of its exports, the benefits have been limited. Bangladesh's exports remain heavily concentrated in textiles, and Chinese demand in this sector is not large enough to significantly alter the trade balance.
China, on its part, may seek to expand its economic footprint in Bangladesh through special economic zones (SEZs) and industrial corridors, similar to its approach in Pakistan under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). While such investments bring capital and employment, they also raise concerns about debt dependency-a point that Bangladesh's policymakers will need to navigate carefully.
One of the biggest strategic questions surrounding Yunus's China visit is how it fits into Bangladesh's broader foreign policy calculus. Historically, Dhaka has pursued a "balanced" diplomacy-maintaining strong ties with both China and India while also engaging with the United States and the European Union.
India, long wary of China's growing influence in its neighborhood, will undoubtedly interpret the visit as part of Beijing's broader South Asian playbook. However, Bangladesh is unlikely to take steps that would directly antagonize New Delhi. Instead, it will seek to reassure India while leveraging Chinese engagements to secure more favorable terms in its economic and water-sharing negotiations with New Delhi.
Meanwhile, the United States, which has intensified its Indo-Pacific strategy to counter China, will be closely watching how Dhaka maneuvers. Bangladesh, despite its economic dependence on China, has also engaged with Washington in recent years, particularly in security cooperation. The challenge for Dhaka will be to avoid getting entangled in great-power rivalries while securing tangible benefits from all sides.
Professor Yunus's visit to China is far more than a diplomatic formality. It is a crucial moment in Bangladesh's strategic evolution-one that will shape its geopolitical and economic trajectory in the coming years. At stake is how Bangladesh positions itself in an increasingly polarized global order, where China, India, and the United States are all competing for influence. While Bangladesh's "balanced" approach has served it well so far, maintaining that equilibrium will require skillful diplomacy, economic foresight, and a clear-eyed understanding of regional dynamics.
For Dr. Yunus, the challenge is clear: to extract the maximum economic and strategic benefits from China without upsetting the broader regional balance. Whether he succeeds or not will depend not just on what is discussed in Beijing-but on how effectively Bangladesh plays its hand in the complex geopolitical chessboard of South Asia.
The writer is a political and defense analyst based in Bangladesh
