Afghan government is now unable to operate properly because of internal and external setbacks, failing to govern effectively and being incapable of defending its citizens. In fact, the government is not able to fend itself effectively. The rising new wave of insurgency is an existential question to the government while US withdrawal of troop drives the country in a hot water. Simultaneously, corruption inflicts the government heavily by pinioning and blindfolding the authority. Even after a lot of aid, Afghanistan could not make remarkable success and the money was finally handed over by the Taliban.
“Though corruption in Afghanistan continued unabated as the US withdrew troops, the anti-corruption teams were "bleeding personnel. The military reduced billets in the anti-corruption units. The State Department began slashing personnel in the anti-corruption teams. The FBI left in 2011; Homeland Security Investigation (HSI) reduced its staffing. US systems, process, policies just didn't work. There was governance in one bucket; security in another bucket.”
According to Breakig Defense, former Ambassador to Afghanistan Ryan Crocker said, the ultimate point of failure for their efforts wasn't an insurgency. It was the weight of endemic corruption. US officials knew corruption was a serious threat and established several anti-corruption units in 2009 and 2010. The National Security Council mandated the multi-agency Afghan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC) to disrupt politically connected networks financing the insurgency. Karl Eikenberry and then General David Petraeus jointly established the civilian-military Rule of Law and Law Enforcement (ROL/LE) structure to reform Afghanistan's graft-ridden police, judiciary and penitentiary system. Shafafiyat (Transparency) was the military's leading anti-corruption task force investigated the opium-and-corruption networks that connected Afghan powerbrokers with the Taliban. That was over six years ago, counterinsurgency, with its ambitious nation-building component, was the richly funded strategy of the moment. But even with Obama's surge of troops and money, the US anti-corruption teams were attacking a massive problem with modest resources. And the anti-corruption campaign was subject to intense political pressures -- both Afghan and American. The political calculus began in 2009, when the US investigations began to uncover malfeasance connected to powerful government insiders. The conflict came to a head in July 2010 when US mentored Afghan special police arrested Muhammad Zia Salehi, a minor official in the Karzai administration, charging him with influence peddling. After Karzai intervened, Salehi was released. In 2011, Karzai again forced the US to back down, this time regarding the financial crimes committed by highly connected Kabul Bank officers, who stole almost a billion dollars. Sarah Chayes, corruption expert and author of Thieves of State, witnessed the dramatic shifts in the US anti-corruption policies in Afghanistan -- shifts that began in Washington. Chayes says Petreaus's anti-corruption support also rapidly waned that Petraeus saw Washington wasn't going to back him up on this as part of the campaign. With counterterrorism the de facto doctrine, US leadership decided they needed Karzai's support at any cost. Counterinsurgency quickly became a dirty word. Often squabbling anti-corruption units struggled to make progress. The State Department and military emphasized working with the Afghan government officials. Though corruption in Afghanistan continued unabated as the US withdrew troops, the anti-corruption teams were "bleeding personnel. The military reduced billets in the anti-corruption units. The State Department began slashing personnel in the anti-corruption teams. The FBI left in 2011; Homeland Security Investigation (HSI) reduced its staffing. US systems, process, policies just didn't work. There was governance in one bucket; security in another bucket. The National Unity Government of President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah took office in 2014 promising to address corruption. After a few highly publicized arrests, there is little to show. The UN corruption report states, there is "a lack of political will." When asked about US counter-corruption efforts in Afghanistan, both the State Department and military defer to the Afghan government. Sixteen years into the American intervention, Afghanistan's government is ranked among the world's most corrupt; ninth on the Fragile States Index. Despite 117 billion US dollars of US development aid since 2002, Afghans remain near the bottom of most human development indices -- victims of "phantom aid," development funding wasted through pernicious greed in both donor and recipient countries. And during this time, empowered and financed by this corruption, Taliban strength has grown at double-digit rates annually since 2005. Insurgents now are pressuring government centers across country.
